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The British way of bodged, incremental constitutional reform is
patently inadequate for the demands of devolution to Scotland and
elsewhere, James Mitchell argues. Whatever the outcome of a
future referendum in Scotland, much better planned reforms and a
new institutional architecture are needed in the UK or rUK – such as
replacing the House of Lords with a House of Nations and Regions.
The recent House of Lords report on the UK Internal Market Bill  joins
the list of reports arguing for reform of intergovernmental relations.
Numerous reports have been issued over the last two decades calling
for greater formalisation and frequency of meetings. Such
constitutional tinkering has been the hallmark of our time.A small
change here and there but with little consideration of unintended
consequences or the overall structure.
We are reminded of problems faced by the Palace of Westminster estate which ‘go
unmended because the pipes are so entwined they cannot safely be dismantled’ and
there are ‘huge tangles of protruding wires and pipes, taped up here and there, leaking,
hot to the touch’. Plumbers and electricians have responded to problems as they arise.
There comes a point when a complete overhaul is needed. The UK constitution is no
different from the Palace of Westminster. The limits of constitutional plumbing have
been reached.
One of the most obvious examples of piecemeal constitutional ad hocery has been the
failure to link Lords reform and devolution. Devolution was conceived as a means of
providing a degree of autonomy but ignored the implications for constitution as a whole
and, crucially, the need for reform at the centre. Lords reform focused, understandably
but unimaginatively, on removing the hereditary element.
Yet, the demand for (further) devolution or independence is based on perceived failings
at the centre. A sense of central government neglect led to the creation of the Scottish
Office in 1885. But the Scottish Office could not be Scotland’s voice at the centre when
appointed by a Prime Minister with little support north of the border. Over the
twentieth century, demand shifted from demanding a stronger voice at the centre to
demanding democratic control of Scottish affairs in Scotland. Scotland’s voice at the
centre only had authority when Scotland’s preferred party coincided with that of the rest
of state. Scotland was either inside or outside in the UK’s winner-takes-all system.
Devolution has not altered this.
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The early years of devolution suggested that a dual state partnership had been created
in which devolved and central governments operated independently within their
respective spheres. Generous levels of public expenditure lubricated relations between
London and the devolved bodies plus Labour dominance across Britain helped. But
recent developments highlight an imbalanced interdependence in which devolved
administrations can be subverted by the centre.
It is no surprise that demands for Scottish control of Scottish affairs  are most
pronounced when the Conservatives are in power. Eighteen years of Tory rule created
demands that secured devolution in 1997. A more emollient Tory Prime Minister with
bountiful public funds might have achieved the ‘respect agenda’ promised by David
Cameron but even then the perception would persist that central government policies
are impositions.
Devolution is a partial, lopsided reform that failed to address the source of grievance.
COVID and Brexit are providing impetus for wholescale change. Manchester’s
experience resonates strongly with of the devolved polities.  English regionalism is
awakening. A new architecture is required and now possible, not more plumbing. The
precise form that new architecture might take will require considerable attention.
Combining devolution and reform at the centre is the way forward. A second powerful
chamber representing the UK’s nations and regions components is needed.
Alternative routes to this end are conceivable. If Scotland votes for independence, it
would need to embark on lengthy negotiations with rUK central government.
Constitutional and political power may be ceded but this will leave grossly imbalanced
economic power that would undermine an independent Scotland from the start.
London-Edinburgh negotiations might lead to a confederal arrangement (which is
where the SNP has been heading for many years even while sticking with the language
of sovereignty and independence) in which the Lords is transformed into a Confederal
Chamber. Interdependence is as inevitable after independence as it is with devolution.
But Scotland would have few allies in the rest of the UK. This route would be long,
tortuous, and far from certain.
Alternatively, a comprehensive package of reforms could be developed with a House of
Nations and Regions at its heart, addressing a fundamental weakness of the current
constitution. The composition of the House of Nations and Regions would need to
provide a different territorial balance from the Commons and involve more than adding
a few territorial representatives. It could address another imbalance in the constitution,
the relationship between the executive and the legislature.
Such reforms could be achieved in stages, building towards a fully directly elected
chamber but consisting initially of indirectly elected representatives drawn from
existing (combinations of) elected authorities where necessary. A staged approach
would meet the need for immediate action and avoid the accusation that this only kicks
a problem into the long grass in the hope that demand for Scottish independence
disappears. But time is short as patience in Scotland is running out.
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Rebalancing the relationship between the centre and its component nations and regions
and the relationship between the legislature and executive requires more than
devolution. Formalising more meetings and increasing contact between devolved and
central government in an imbalanced power relationship will make little difference.
More frequent formal IGR meetings will simply create more opportunities for
adversarial grandstanding. The centre has long been the cause of grievances and any
response needs to bring it into the equation.
___________________
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